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IN Tl-IE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. ALEEN BAKER, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, W. L. YOUNG 
BROKERAGE COMPANY and 
the STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 10288 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner H. Aleen Baker has sought review by 
certiorari from a decision of the Industrial Commission 
denying her compensation pursuant to her claim for injuries 
allegedly sustained during the course of her employment. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On August 9, 1964, the petitioner applied for a hearing 
upon her claim for workmen's compensation (R. 5). She 
allfged that on the 8th of May, 1964, while filing papers, 
~he sustained a ruptured disc (R. 5). On October 19, 1964, 
a hearing was held upon the application before the Indus-
triai Commission's referee ( R. 8). Subsequently, on the 
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25th of November, 1964, the Industrial Commission en-
tered its order finding that the petitioner's claimed ailmem 
was not caused by an accident arising out of the course of 
her employment (R. 34). On December 6, 1964, a peti-
tion for rehearing was filed, and on December 9, 1964 it 
' was denied (R. 35, 36). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent Industrial Commission submits the court 
should sustain its order denying the petitioner workmen's 
compensation coverage. It should be noted that neither the 
employer nor the State Insurance Fund, who was the insur-
ance carrier, has been served in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent accepts the petitioner's Statement of 
Facts as set out in her brief, except that the respondent , 
desires to call to the court's attention the following facts 
concerning the alleged injury. 
Petitioner testified on cross-examination at the time of 
the hearing before the Industrial Commission ( R. 18) : 
"Q. Now I take it that you do not know exactly what ' 
caused this problem with your back? 
"A. No, I don't. Except that it occurred while I was 
filing in the office. And I hadn't done anything out of 
the ordinary either at home or at work, or after work. 
to have caused it. Very definitely." 
On the day of the alleged injury she did not call the 
matter to her employer's attention and spent the week-end 
at home without consulting a physician ( R. 20). There-
after she returned to work the Monday following the Frida) 
when the alleged accident was supposed to have occurred 
.. 
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and worked that day without informing her employer of 
the alleged injury. Not until the following day did she 
mention to her employer that she was suffering any back 
pain. She testified: "I believe I told Mr. Douglas Smith." 
( R. 12.) She further testified that she believed she told him 
the Tuesday following the alleged accident. The petitioner 
had changed residences and moved personal belongings 
approximately one month prior to the accident (R. 17). 
There was no evidence offered of any slip, fall or unusual 
exertion ( R. 34) . Based on the above, the Commission 
ruled that the ruptured disc was not the result of any ac-
tivity of the petitioner's employment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE co:MMISSION WAS NOT OBLIGED TO BELIEVE THE 
PETITIONER'S STATEMENT AS TO THE ALLEGED IN-
}UJ{ Y AND THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUB-
STANTIATE THE COMMISSION'S REJECTION OF THE 
PETITIONER'S CLAIM. 
It is well settled that this court on review of the order of 
the Industrial Commission will not interfere with the find-
ings of the Commission unless the findings are without rea-
sonable basis and unsupported by substantial evidence. 
Freuhauf Trailer Co. v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 
2d 95, 396 P.2d 409 ( 1964). In order for the petitioner to 
prevail in the instant case, this court must find that the 
Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and 
unreasonably refused to consider evidence which would 
have justified an award. Kent v. Industrial Commission, 
89 Utah 381, 57 P.2d 724 ( 1936). 
In the instant case the evidence is obviously sufficient 
to sustain the findings of the Industrial Commission. The 
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evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
Commission's determination, discloses that the petitioner 
was not engaging in any unusual exertion or heavy activity 
when the alleged accident occurred. By her own testimony 
she was uncertain as to just when and how the alleged in-
jury occurred. She was engaged in routine office activities 
which, under normal circumstances, would be unlikely to ' 
result in the injury complained of. By her own admissions, 
she returned to work following the day in which she felt 
the injury occurred, and did not report the matter to her 
employer. Further, she did not seek medical attention over 
the week-end. The petitioner's statements to other persons 
show that there is doubt in her mind as to when and how ' 
the accident occurred. Thus, she told Helen Morris that 
she "guessed" that she hurt her back filing ( R. 24). She 
also indicated to Phyllis Wright that she was uncertain as 
to how the injury occurred. Miss Wright testified that the 
petitioner stated: "I hurt my back at work, I guess." 
( R. 26.) She did not disclose to Phyllis Larsen how she 
hurt her back ( R. 28), and told Beverly Cudney that she 
"thought" she hurt her back while filing. It is apparent, 
therefore, that the petitioner retained a good deal of un-
certainty in her own mind as to just how and when the acci-
dent occurred. 
In Smith v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 318, 140 
P.2d 394 ( 1943), this court observed that in workmen's 
compensation cases the award must be based on facts found 
from the evidence and not "mere possibility." The court in 
that case in similar circumstances found it within the prov· 
ince of the Commission to deny the award. 
In Holland v. Industrial Commission, 5 Utah 2d 105, 
297 P.2d 230 ( 1956) the petitioner contended that he sus· 
tained a ruptured disc from an industrial accident. In that 
,-; 1, 1 th(' 1Tidcncc of the petitioner's actual involvement was 
,ub,t.u1tially greater than in the instant case, since the fore-
man actually observed the alleged accident. This court held 
that the actions of the Industrial Commission in denying 
rccO\'ery wne not arbitrary and capricious, and that the 
Commission was not obliged to believe the claimant's un-
corroborated testimony. This case is similar in circumstance 
since the petitioner here did not notify her employer of the 
alleged injury until several clays after its occurrence and 
resumed work during the interim. Further, her state-
ments to other persons show that she entertained doubt as 
to the actual cause of the pain in her back. Also, approxi-
mately one month prior to the alleged incident she had been 
involved in the process of moving her residence, which must 
ha\'e entailed some physical activity. Thus, the Holland 
case supports the Commission's action in this case. There 
was no "identifiable accident" which the Commission could 
say caused the injury. Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 14 
Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 ( 1963). 
In Allen v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 184 
Kan, 184, 334 P.2d 370, the petitioner, seeking affirmation 
of the Industrial Commission's award which had been set 
asic~e by the trial court, claimed that he sustained an injury 
to his back which was in the nature of a kink or pain while 
he was on the job as he was talking to his foreman. The 
Kansas Supreme Court noted that the question of the 
credrnce of the witnesses was for the triers of fact and that 
the trial court's determination that the injury did not arise 
out of the employment should be sustained. 
It is submitted that there is sufficient precedent in this 
State' and in other jurisdictions to sustain the Commission's 
cktf'rmination that an award in this case was not justified. 
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CONCLUSION 
The facts before the Commission in this case do not 
demonstrate clearly that the petitioner sustained an injury 
as a result of her employment. Indeed, this court in Maim. 
strom v. Olson~ 10110, 19 March 1965 (Ut. Sup. Ct.) most 
recently acknowledged that a ruptured disc is usually an 
unusual occurrence resulting from a violent act. The ab. 
sence of any unusual activity, the delay of the petitioner in 
reporting the incident, and her own incredulity lends sup-
port to the Commission's determination that the injury did 
not result from the petitioner's employment. This court 
should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
